A

VIEW

Of that Part of the late

Considerations

Addreſt to *H. H.* about the

TRINITY.

Which concerns the

Sober Enquiry,

On that Subject.

In a Letter to the former Friend.

LONDON,

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

A View of the late CONSIDERATIONS *addreſt to* H. H. *about the* TRINITY.

YOU ſee, Sir, I make no haſte to tell you my Thoughts of what hath been publiſh'd ſince my laſt to you, againſt my Sentiments touching the H. Trinity. I ſaw the Matter leſs required my Time and Thoughts, than my other Affairs: And ſo little, that I was almoſt indifferent whether I took any notice thereof or no. There is really nothing of Argument in what I have ſeen, but what I had ſuggeſted before, and objected to my ſelf, in *thoſe very Diſcourſes* of mine, now animadverted on; which not having prevented, with me, the Opinion

I am of, can as little alter it, and ſhould as little any Man's elſe.

But a little leaſure, as it can, without extortion, be gained from *other occaſions*, I do not much grudg to beſtow on *this*.

I find my ſelf concern'd in the *late Conſiderations* on the Explications of the Doctrine of the *Trinity*----in a Letter to *H. H.*

The Author is pleas'd to give me the honour of a Name, a lank, unvocal one. It is ſo contrived, that one may eaſily gueſs whom he means; but the reaſon of his doing ſo I cannot gueſs. Is it becauſe he knew *himſelf*, what he would have others believe?

But I ſuppoſe he as well knew his *own Name*. If he knew not the former, he ran the hazard of injuring either the ſuppoſed Author, or the true, or both. I could, I believe, make as ſhrewd a gueſs at *his Name*, and expreſs it as plainly. But I think it not civil to do ſo; becauſe I apprehend he hath ſome rea-

reaſon to conceal it, whereof I think he hath a Right to be the Judg. But I will not preſcribe to him Rules of Civility, of which that he is a great Judg, I will not allow my ſelf to doubt.

Yet I will not ſuppoſe him to have ſo very diminiſhing Thoughts of *our Saviour*, as not to acknowledg and reverence the Authority of that *great Rule of his*, which he knows gain'd Reverence with ſome who called not themſelves Chriſtians, [*Whatſoever you would that Men ſhould do to you*----&c.] Nor can divine what greater reaſon he ſhould have to hide his own Name, than to expoſe mine, or make the Perſon he indigitates, be thought the Author of the Diſcourſe he intended to expoſe. Since no Man can imagine how, as the *Chriſtian World* is conſtituted, any one can be more obnoxious for denying *three Perſons*, than for aſſerting *three Gods*: Which latter his impotent attempt aims to make *that Author* do.

For his Cenſures of *that Author's* ſtile, and difficulty to be underſtood, they offend me not. But ſo I have known ſome pretend Deafneſs, to what they were unwilling to hear. There is indeed one place *Sob. Enq. p.* 24. in the end of *Sect.* 8. where *muſt* ſhould have been left out, upon the adding afterwards of *can*; that might give one ſome trouble. In which yet, the ſuppoſal of a (not unuſual) *Aſyndeton*, would, without the help of Magick, have reliev'd a conſidering Reader.

And for his Complements, as they do me no real good, ſo, I thank God, they hurt me not. I dwell at Home, and better know my own Furniture, than another can.

For himſelf, I diſcern, and readily acknowledg, in him, thoſe excellent Accompliſhments, for which I moſt heartily wiſh him an Advocate in a better Cauſe, without Deſpair he will yet prove ſo; when I take notice of ſome Paſſages which look like Indications of

a ſerious temper of Mind, as of *chooſing God, and the honour of his Name, for our Portion and Deſign*; and *that he lives in vain, who knows not his Maker, and his God*, with the like.

But on the other hand, I was as heartily ſorry to meet with an expreſſion of ſo different a ſtrain, on ſo awful a Subject, of *making a Coat for the Moon.*

That Precept which *Joſephus* inſerts among thoſe given the *Jews*, doth for the reaſon it hath in it, abſtracting from its Authority, deſerve to be conſidered. It ſeems to import a decency to the reſt of Mankind, whoſe notions of a Deity did not argue them ſunk into the loweſt degrees of Sottiſhneſs and Stupidity. Good Sir, what needed (think you) ſo adventurous Boldneſs, in ſo lubricous a Caſe! It gains nothing to a Man's Cauſe either of Strength or Reputation with wiſe and good Men. A ſound Argument will be as ſound without it. Nor

βλασφημείτω δὲ μηδεὶς θεὸς, ὃς πόλεις ἄλλαι νομίζουσι. *Lib.* 4. *Jud. Antiq.*

ſhould I much value having them on my ſide, whom I can hope to make laugh at ſo hazardous a Jeſt. I can never indeed have any great Veneration for a moroſe Sourneſs, whatſoever affected appearance it may have with it, of a ſimulated Sanctimony or Religiouſneſs; but I ſhould think it no hardſhip upon me to repreſs that Levity, as to attempt dancing upon the brink of ſo tremendous a Precipice. And would always expreſs my ſelf with ſuſpicion, and a ſuppoſed poſſibility of being miſtaken, in a caſe wherein I find many of noted Judgment and Integrity, in the ſucceſſion of ſeveral Ages, differing from me.

But go we on to the Cauſe it ſelf, where he pretends,

1. Firſt to give a View of the Sober Enquirer's Hypotheſis.

2. And then to argue againſt it.

As to the former. He doth it, I am loth to ſay, with leſs fairneſs than from a Perſon of his (otherwiſe) appearing In-

Ingenuity, one would expect. For he really makes me to have *ſaid more than I ever did*, in divers Inſtances; and *much leſs* than I have expreſly ſaid; and that he cannot have ſo little underſtanding as not to know was moſt material to the Cauſe in hand.

He repreſents me *p.* 40. *col.* 1. *ſaying* the Perſons *are diſtinct Eſſences, numerical Natures, Beings, Subſtances*; and *col.* 2. *That I hold them to be three Spirits*; when in the cloſe of one of thoſe Paragraphs, viz. *Calm Diſcourſe, p.* 112, 113. I recite the Words of *W. J.* "In the Unity "of the Godhead there muſt be no "plurality or multiplicity of Subſtan-"ces allowed: And do add, *nor do I ſay* that there muſt. And *p.* 39, 40. "I do not poſitively ſay there are three "diſtinct Subſtances, Minds, or Spi-"rits. I would ask this my learned Antagoniſt, have *ſaying*, and *not ſaying*, the ſame ſignification? And again, when *Calm Diſcourſe*, p. 123. my words are, *I will not uſe the Expreſſions*, as ſignifying

fying my formed Judgment, *That there are three Things, Subſtances or Spirits in the Godhead*; how could he ſay, *I hold the three Perſons to be three Spirits?* Is any Man, according to the ordinary way of ſpeaking, ſaid *to hold* what is not his *formed Judgment?* If he only *propoſe* things whereof he doubts, to be conſidered and diſcuſt by others, *in order to* the forming of it, and by gentle ventilation to ſift out Truth, it the rather argues him not to *hold* this or that.

And I think much Service might be done to the *common Intereſt of Religion*, by ſuch a free mutual Communication of even more doubtful Thoughts, if ſuch Diſquiſitions were purſu'd with more Candour, and with leſs Confidence and prepoſſeſſion of Mind, or addictedneſs to the Intereſt of any Party whatſoever. If it were rather endeavoured, to reaſon one another into, or out of, this or that Opinion, than either by Sophiſtical Colluſions to cheat, or to Hector by great words, one that is

not

not of my mind. Or if the Deſign were leſs to expoſe an Adverſary, than to clear the matter in Controverſy.

Beſides, that if ſuch Equanimity did more generally appear, and govern, in Tranſactions of this nature, it would produce a greater liberty in communicating our Thoughts, about ſome of the more vogued and faſhionable Opinions, by exempting each other from the fear of ill Treatment, *in the moſt ſenſible kind.* It being too manifeſt, that the ſame confident inſulting *Genius*, which makes a Man think himſelf competent to be a Standard to Mankind, would alſo make him impatient of diſſent, and tempt him to do worſe, than reproach one that differs from him, if it were in his power. And the Club or Fagot-Arguments muſt be expected to take place, where what *he thinks* rational ones, did not do the buſineſs. This only on the by.

In the mean time *that there is a Trinity in the Godhead*, is no matter of doubt with

with me; but only whether *this* be the *beſt way* of explaining and defending it. If *this be* not the *beſt*, or *ſufficient*, ſome other will, I believe, or hath been found out by ſome other. Of which I have ſpoken my ſenſe not only indefinitely, *Calm Diſc. p.* 81. but particularly of the more common way; not that I did then, or have yet thought it *the beſt*, but *not indefenſible*, p. 73, 74.

And I muſt now ſincerely profeſs, That the peruſal of *theſe very Conſiderations* gives me more confidence about *this Hypotheſis*, than I allowed my ſelf before; finding that the *very ſagacious Author* of them, of whoſe Abilities and Induſtry together, I really have that Opinion, as to count him the moſt likely to confute it of all the *modern Antitrinitarians*, hath no other way to deal with it, than firſt, both *partially* and *invidiouſly* to repreſent it; and then, rather to *triſle* than *argue* againſt it. He firſt paints it out in *falſe* and *ugly Colours*, before he comes to *reaſoning*. And then, when he

he *ſhould reaſon*, he ſays nothing that hath ſo much as a *colour*. It ſeems to me an Argument of a ſuſpected ill Cauſe on his ſide, that he thought it needful to prepoſſeſs the Reader with the imagination of I know not (and I believe he knows not) what *groſs Ideas*, as he romances, belonging to this *Hypotheſis*. Becauſe from thoſe words, Prov. 8. *Then was I by him, as one brought up with him, and daily his Delight*; the Author ſpeaks of the *delicious Society*, which theſe words intimate, the *Eternal Wiſdom*, and the *prime Author and Parent of all things*, to have each with other.

For my part, I have little doubt but this ingenious Writer is ſo well acquainted with the guſt and reliſh of intellectual Delight, that he choſe to expoſe his Adverſary by uſing that odd Expreſſion of *groſs Ideas* ſo cauſleſly, in accommodation only to the *Genius* of *ſome other Men*, whom he thought fit to humour, rather *than his own*. Nor can he be ſo little acquainted with the *Paganiſh Theo-*

logy,

logy, as not to apprehend a *vaſt diſagreement* between *this* and *that*, and a *much greater Agreement* between the *Paganiſh Notion* of the Deity, and *his own*.

For *the Queſtions* which he ſuppoſes me to put, and makes me anſwer as he thinks fit, by (miſapplied) Paſſages of that Diſcourſe, I hope it will appear they were either prevented, or anſwered at another rate.

At length he ſays, The *Butt-end of this Hypotheſis*, &c.

I like not *that Phraſe* the worſe for the *Author's* ſake, of whom it ſeems borrowed, whoſe Memory greater things will make live, when we are forgot.

But let him proceed---*The Butt-end of this Hypotheſis is the true ſtrength of it*. But that *true ſtrength* he hath either had *the hap* not to obſerve, or taken *the care* not to repreſent, *i. e.* from what is ſo often inculcated *in that Diſcourſe, the neceſſary exiſtence of two Hypoſtaſes of and in the firſt*, and of *an omnimodous ſimplicity* groundleſly ſuppoſed in the *Divine Being*, he hath

hath kept himſelf at a wary cautious diſtance, when he might apprehend *there was its ſtrength.* Therefore I cannot alſo but obſerve, that as he hath *mark'd* this Hypotheſis, with (moſt undue) *ill Characters*; ſo he hath *maimed* it too, of what was moſt conſiderable belonging to it, that he might expoſe it *by the former means*, ſo as to make it need *much defence*; and that *by the latter*, it might ſeem quite deſtitute of any defence at all.

And now when (not without ſome untoward Disfigurations) it hath thus far 'ſcap'd his hands, and is (in none of the beſt ſhapes) ſet up only to be beaten down; The *Argument* he firſt attacks it with is the *inartificial one* of *Authority.* And yet his Argument from *this Topick*, is only negative, that *the Opinion* he would confute *wants Authority*, " That *the Enquirer* was the *firſt that ever dreamt of it.* And that no learned Divine of any Perſwaſion will ſubſcribe to it: *q. d.* 'Tis falſe, and *impoſſible to be*

be true; the *Enquirer* only propoſing what he offer'd, *as poſſible for ought we know*, is not otherwiſe oppos'd than by aſſerting it to be impoſſible. This therefore he muſt ſay, or he ſaith nothing to the purpoſe; And why now is it impoſſible? *Becauſe no Body ſaid it before.* So, then, was every thing that any Man *firſt ſaid*; but afterwards, by being often ſpoken, it might, it ſeems, at length become true!

For any *learned Divines ſubſcribing to it*, I ſuppoſe he intends *that* in the *ſtrict ſenſe*. And ſo the *Enquirer* never ſaid he would ſubſcribe it himſelf, otherwiſe than that his Judgment did more incline to it, as liable to *leſs exception* than *other ways of defending the Doctrine of the Trinity*, or than denying it, which he thought *leaſt defenſible of all*.

But now ſuppoſing one ſhould find *learned Divines* of the ſame Mind, (and perhaps ſome may be found more confident than he) I would ask the *Conſide-*

rator,

rator; whether he will therefore confeſs a *Trinity* a poſſible thing?

If not, he deals not fairly, to put the *Enquirer* upon quoting Authorities to no purpoſe: Or that he would have *them* conclude him, by whom he will not be concluded himſelf.

He ſeems indeed himſelf to have forgot the Queſtion (with which afterwards he charges the *Enquirer*) as it is ſet down *Sober Enquiry p.* 1. Whether *a Trinity* in the Godhead be a *poſſible thing*? This was the Queſtion, not what *John*, or *Thomas*, or *James ſuch a One* thought?

But while he pretends to think no body elſe is of *the Enquirer's* Mind in the particular point he is now ſpeaking to, *i. e.* the *Delicious Society* the *Divine Hypoſtaſes* are ſuppoſed to have with each other; give me leave freely to diſcourſe this matter. I would fain know what it is, wherein he ſuppoſes *the Enquirer* to have overſhot his Mark: Or of what makes he here ſo mighty a Wonderment?

It can be but one of these two things:

Either that there are three Divine Persons in the Godhead really distinct; Or,

That they have (if there be) a Delicious Society or Conversation with each other.

Will he say *the former* is a singular Opinion? Or that 'tis Novel? Was there never a *real Trinitarian* in the World before? Doth he not, in his own expres words, sort *the Enquirer* with one, whom he will not deny to be a *learned Divine*, *p.* 43. of these his *present Considerations*, col. 1. [*The Author of the* 28 *Propositions, and Mr.* H--w, as he calls the Enquirer, *are honest Men, and real Trinitarians.*] By which former Character he hath, I dare say, ten thousand times more gratify'd his Ambition, than by calling him *learned* too. And I believe he will as little think this a *novel Opinion*, as a *singular* one.

Nor shall I thank him for acknowledging it to have been the Opinion of

the Fathers, generally, not only *Ante-Nicene* and *Nicene*, but *Poſt-Nicene* too, for ſome following Ages, unto that of *P. Lombard*, ſo obvious it is to every one that will but more ſlightly ſearch.

For my part, I will not except *Juſtin Martyr* himſelf, whom I the rather mention, both as he was one of the more *antient* of the Fathers; and as I may alſo call him, the *Father of the Modaliſts*; nor *his Notion* even about the *Homoouſian-Trinity*, as he expreſly ſtiles it. Ενθ. πιϛ.

For tho it will require more time than I now intend to beſtow, to give a diſtinct account of every Paſſage throughout that Diſcourſe of his, yet his Expreſſion of the τρόποι ὑπάρξεως muſt not be ſo taken, as if it were to be torn away from its coherence, and from it ſelf. When therefore he ſays the τὸ μὴ ἀγέννητον, ἢ γεννητὸν, ἢ ἐκπορευτὸν, the being unbegotten, begotten, and having proceeded, are not Names of the Eſſence, but (τρόποι ὑπάρξεως) Modes of Subſiſtence; he muſt mean they are not *immediately*

Names of the Eſſence, but *mediately* they cannot but be ſo. For what do they modify? Not nothing. When they are ſaid to be Modes of Subſiſtence, what is it that ſubſiſts? We cannot pluck away theſe Modes of Subſiſtence from that which ſubſiſts, and whereof they are the Modes. And what is that? You'll ſay the μία ὐσία, the *one Eſſence*, which he had mentioned before; and that *one Eſſence* is, 'tis true, as perfectly one, as 'tis poſſible; for *what is of it ſelf*, and *what are from that*, to be with *each other*, *i. e.* that they are *congenerous*, as the Sun and its Rays (according to that *Heb.* 1. 3. ἀπαύγασμα τ δόξης, the effulgency of Glory) or as *Mind*, and (where there is nothing elſe but Subſtance) *conſubſtantial Thought* or *Word*. Therefore this *Oneneſs of Eſſence* muſt be taken in ſo large and extenſive a ſenſe, as that it may admit of *theſe Differences*. For ſo he afterwards plainly ſpeaks, if "ὁ μὲν, "ἀγεννήτως ἔχει; *If the one* (the Father) "hath his Exiſtence without being be-

"gotten,

" gotten, ὁ γεννητῶς, *another* (the Son)
" by *being begotten*, τὸ δὲ, ἐκπορευτῶς, but
" *that* (the Holy Ghoſt) *by having pro-*
" *ceeded, here it befals us to behold differen-*
" *ces* (τὰ τῆς διαφορᾶς) or the things that
" import difference. There muſt be *a ſenſe*, therefore, wherein he underſtood *this Eſſence* to be *moſt truly One*; and *a ſenſe* wherein he alſo underſtood it to *have* its *differences*, and thoſe too not unimportant ones, as *being unbegotten*, and *being begotten*, ſignify no light differences.

And in what latitude of ſenſe he underſtood the *Oneneſs of Eſſence*, whereof he had before ſpoken, may be ſeen in his following Explication, when what he ſaid he would have be (σαφέστερον) more manifeſt; he makes *Adam*'s peculiar *Mode* of *Subſiſtence* to be that he was ὁ γεννετὸς, ἀλλὰ διαπλαθεὶς, *not begotten*, but *made* by God's own Hand; but *for them that were from him*, he intimates *theirs* to be, that they were *begotten*, not *made*. If then you enquire concerning the *ſame Eſſence* that

was common to *him* and *them*, you ſtill find that *Man* is the ὑποκείμενον, the Subject, whether of *formation*, as to *him*, or of *generation*, as *to them*. And who apprehends not in what latitude of ſenſe the *humane Nature* is *One*, which is common to *Adam*, and his *Poſterity*? Tho the *Divine Nature* is incomparably *more One*, which is common to the *Father*, *Son*, and *Spirit*, as we have formerly inſiſted, and ſhall further ſhew it cannot but be, in all *neceſſary*, and *continually-depending Emanations*.

Yet I might, if there were need, again (as to this part) quote the *Conſiderator* to *himſelf*. For I ſuppoſe he will not diſown the *Conſiderations* in 1693. in which, *pag.* 15. *col.* 1. are theſe words, *Dr.* Cudworth *by a great number of very pertinent and Home-quotations, hath proved that his Explication* (*I mean that part of it which makes the three Perſons to be ſo many diſtinct Eſſences, or Subſtances*) *is the Doctrine of the Principal, if not of all the* Fathers, *as well as of the* Platoniſts. And

'tis

'tis added, *and I (for my own part) do grant it.*

Upon the whole then, I reckon that as to this *firſt part*, we ſtand clear not only to the reſt of the World, but with *this Author* himſelf, that to be a *real Trinitarian* is not ſo unheard-of a thing, or what no learned Divine of any Perſwaſion ever dreamt of before the *Enquirer*. But now for the

Second Part. *The Delicious Society ſuppoſed to be between* (or rather among) *the three Perſons.* Is this a Dream! And ſo ſtrange a One! Why, good Sir! Can you ſuppoſe *three Perſons*, i.e. *three intellectual Subſiſtences*, perfectly Wiſe, Holy, and Good, co-exiſting with, inexiſting in one another, to have no Society? Or that Society not to be delicious? He ſays, How can it be? I ſay, how can it but be? Herein I am ſure *the Enquirer* hath far more Company than *in the former.* For whether the *three Perſons* have all the ſame *numerical Eſſence*, or *three diſtinct*; all agree they moſt delightfully

converſe. Will he pretend never to have read any that make *Love* (as it were intercurrent between the *two firſt*) the Character of the *third*? In ſhort; Is it *the Thing* he quarrels with as ſingular, or *the Word*? At *the Thing*, ſuppoſing *three Perſons*, he can have no Quarrel, without quarreling with the common Senſe of Mankind. For the Word, he hath more wit and knowledg of Language than to pretend to find fault with that. For let him but conſult Expoſitors (even the known Criticks) upon the mentioned place *Prov.* 8. (whom, in ſo plain a caſe, I will not be at the pains to quote and tranſcribe) and take notice whether none read thoſe words, *fui in deliciis*. Therefore I believe *the Conſiderator* will be ſo ingenuous, as to perceive, he hath, in this part of his Diſcourſe, groſly overſhot, or underſhot, or ſhot wide of his own Mark, if indeed he had any, or did not (letting his Bolt fly too ſoon) ſhoot at Rovers, before he had taken ſteady aim at any thing. In ſhort, all

this

this Duſt could be rais'd but with deſign only, becauſe he could not *enlighten* his Readers, to *blind* them.

But now when he ſhould come by ſolid Argument to diſprove the Hypotheſis, by *ſhewing that three individual Divine Natures, or Eſſences, can poſſibly have no Nexus, ſo as to become one entire Divine Nature, and, at the ſame time, (which this Hypotheſis ſuppoſes) remain ſtill three individual Divine Natures and Eſſences*, he thinks fit to leave it to another to do it for him, who, he ſays, *if he cannot prove this, can prove nothing*. And when we ſee that Proof, it will be time enough to conſider it.

In the mean time I cannot here but note what I will neither, in Charity, call Forgery in the *Conſiderator*, nor, in Civility, Ignorance, but it cannot be leſs than great Overſight; his talk of *theſe Three*, ſo united as to *become One* : the Enquirer never ſpake (nor *dreamt*) of their *becoming One*, but of their being naturally, neceſſarily, and eternally ſo.

Then

Then he comes to put the Queſtion, as (he ſays) it is *between* the *Enquirer* and the *Socinians*. And he puts it thus, *How three diſtinct, ſeveral, individual, Divine Beings, Eſſences, or Subſtances, ſhould remain three ſeveral individual Subſtances, and yet, at the ſame time, be united into One Divine Subſtance called God?* One would have thought, when he had ſo newly wav'd the *former Queſtion*, as wherein he meant not to be concern'd, he ſhould preſently have put a *new One*, upon which he intended to engage himſelf. But we have *the ſame* over again, even with the ſame *ill look* of an equivalent Phraſe unto [*becoming*] [*united*] *into One*, to inſinuate to his Reader, as if his Antagoniſt thought theſe Three were *de novo united*, not *in*, but *into One*. Which he knew muſt have a harſh ſound, and as well knew it to be moſt repugnant to the *Enquirer's* moſt declared Sentiment. Nor will it be any preſumption, if I take the liberty to ſet down the Queſtion according to the *Enquirer's Mind*, who have

have as much reaſon to know it, as *he*; and I am ſure it will be more agreeable to the tenour of his Diſcourſe now referr'd to, *Whether the* τὸ θεῖον, *or the Divine Being, may not poſſibly, for ought we know, contain three Natures, or Eſſences, under the Names of Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt, ſo far diſtinct, as is neceſſary to found the diſtinct Predications or Attributions ſeverally given them in the Holy Scriptures, and yet be eternally, neceſſarily, naturally, vitally ſo united, as notwithſtanding that remaining diſtinction, to be One God.*

And let us now ſee what he hath to ſay;

Firſt, To the Enquirer's Illuſtrations of it, *as poſſible.*

Secondly, What he brings to *prove it impoſſible.*

As to the former part. He firſt falls upon what *the Enquirer* had ſaid concerning the *vegetative*, *ſenſitive*, and *intellective Natures* in our ſelves. And upon this he inſiſts ſo operouſly, as if the whole weight of the Cauſe had been laid upon it,

it, and ſeems to think the *Enquirer* had forgot the Queſtion, when he mentioned it; becauſe he ſays, thoſe are only *diſtinct Faculties*, not *Perſons*, or *Subſtances* (tho *Perſons* were not in his Queſtion) without ever taking any notice of the Enquirer's waving it, with theſe words, *That he would content himſelf with what was more obvious.* But this is is *all Art.* To raiſe a *mighty poſſe*, and labour to ſeem to thoſe that he believed would read what he writ only, not what the other did, moſt effectually to expugne what he ſaw was neglected, tho not altogether uſeleſs, as we ſhall ſee anon.

In the mean time, it is obſervable how needleſly he ſlurs himſelf in this his firſt brisk Onſet. He ſays, *No Man ever pretended---That the vegetative, ſenſitive, and intellective Faculties (or Powers) are ſo many diſtinct, individual Perſons, Subſtances, or Eſſences, we grant*, &c.

What did no Man ever pretend that *theſe three diſtinct Natures*, the *vegetative*, *ſenſitive*, *intellective*, were, in Man, three diſtinct

diſtinct *Subſtances*, or *Souls*, concurring by a certain ſubordination in him? What neceſſity was there, that to heighten his Triumph, in the Opinion of his credulous Followers, he ſhould, with ſo glorious a Confidence, put on the vain and falſe ſhew of having all the World on his ſide; and herein either diſſemble his Knowledge, or groſly bewray his Ignorance in the meer *Hiſtory* of *Philoſophy*. And moſt imprudently ſuppoſe all his Readers as ignorant, as he would ſeem! What, did he never hear of an *Averroiſt* in the World? Doth he not know that *Phyſician* and *Philoſopher*, and his *Followers*, earneſtly contended for what he ſays no Man ever pretended to? Or that divers *other Commentators* upon *Ariſtotle*, have ſome abetted, others as vehemently oppos'd them in it? Not to inſiſt alſo that ſome thought the *Intellectus Agens*, and *Patiens* to be *diſtinct Subſtances*, belonging to the Nature of Man, as others had alſo other Conceits about the former? And if he look *ſome hundreds of Years*

Years back, as far as the time, and extant Work of *Nemeſius*, *Biſhop* and *Philoſopher* (as he writes himſelf) *of the Nature of Man*, (who liv'd in the Time of *Gregory Nazianzen*, as appears by an *Epiſtle* of his writ to him, and prefixt to that little Book of his) he will find *that Author* takes notice there were divers that took Man to conſiſt of *Mind*, *Soul*, and *Body*, and that ſome did doubt *whether the Mind ſupervening to the Soul, as one to the other, did not make the latter intelligent*. And in ſeveral other parts of that Work (eaſy, if it were neceſſary to be recited) he ſpeaks it as the Judgment of ſome, *That the unreaſonable Nature in Man did exiſt by it ſelf, as being of it ſelf an unreaſonable Soul, not a part of the reaſonable, accounting it one of the greateſt Abſurdities*, that the *unreaſonable Soul* ſhould be a part of that which is *reaſonable*.

Πότερον προσελθὼν ὁ νοῦς τῇ ψυχῇ ὡς ἄλλο ἄλλῃ νοερὸν αὐτὴν ἐποίησεν, &c. cap. 1.

Καθ' ἑαυτὴν εἶναι ὡς λόγον ψυχήν.

Τῶν ἀτοπωτάτων, cap. 16.

And

And he carries us yet much farther back, referring us to *Plotinus*, in whom any that will, may read much more to that purpoſe in many places. *Enn. 6. lib. 7. cap. 5, 6, 7, &c.*

It matters not whether this Opinion be true or falſe, but a great miſtake (or miſrepreſentation) it was, to ſay no Man ever pretended to it.

And be that as it will; if all the *Readers* will ſuſpend their Judgments, *That a Trinity in the Godhead is impoſſible*, till the *Conſiderator* ſhall have prov'd, by plain demonſtration, the concurrence of three ſuch *Spirits* (a *vegetative*, *ſenſitive*, and *intellective*) vitally united *in the Conſtitution of Man*, is a thing *ſimply impoſſible*, I believe he will not in haſte, have many Proſelytes.

I, for my part, as his own Eyes might have told him, laid no ſtreſs upon it; but only mentioned it *in tranſitu*, as I was going on to what is obvious, and in view to every Man, *the union between our Soul and Body*. Nor was I ſollicitous

licitous to find *this* an *exact Parallel*, as he fancies I was obliged to do. What if there be no exact Parallel? Will any Man of a ſober Mind, or that is Maſter of his own Thoughts, conclude every thing impoſſible *in the uncreated Being*, whereof there is not an exact parallel *in the Creation*? If any Man will ſtand upon this, come make an Argument of it, let us ſee it in form, and try its ſtrength. [*Whatſoever hath not its exact parallel in the Creation, is impoſſible in God,*] &c. He will ſooner prove himſelf ridiculous, than prove his Point by ſuch a *Medium*.

'Tis enough for a ſober Man's purpoſe, in ſuch a caſe as we are now conſidering, if we find ſuch things actually are (or might as eaſily be, as what we ſee actually is) among the Creatures, that are *of as difficult conception, and explication*, as what appears repreſented in the *Enquirers Hypotheſis* concerning a Trinity. 'Tis trifling to attempt to give, or to ask a parallel exact *per omnia*.

It

It abundantly ſerves any reaſonable purpoſe, if there be a parallel *quoad hoc*, viz. *in reſpect of the facility or difficulty of Conception.* And tho the *vegetative, ſenſitive*, and *intellective* Natures be not ſo many diſtinct Subſtances, a Trinity is not leſs conceivable in the Divine Being, than three ſuch Natures, or natural Powers, in the One humane Nature.

And whoever they be that will not *ſimplify the Divine Being into nothing* (as the Excellent *Author* of the 28 Propoſitions ſpeaks) muſt alſo acknowledg the moſt real Perfections in the Divine Being, tho not univocal, but infinitely tranſcendent to any thing in us. And are they no way diſtinct? Let any ſober Underſtanding judg, will the *ſame Notion* agree to them all? Is his *Knowledg*, throughout, the ſame with his *effective Power*? Then he muſt *make himſelf*. For who can doubt he *knows himſelf*? And is *his Will* the ſelf-ſame undiſtinguiſhable Perfection, in him, with *his Knowledg*? Then the *Purpoſes of his Will* muſt be to

effect all that he can. For doth he not know all that he can do? And the *Complacencies of his Will* muſt be as much in what is *evil*, as *good*, even in the moſt odious turpitude of the vileſt, and moſt immoral Evils! For he knows both alike. I know what is commonly ſaid of *extrinſecal Denominations*: But are ſuch Denominations true, or falſe? Have they any thing *in re* correſpondent to them, or have they not? Then *ſome diſtinction* there muſt be of *theſe Perfections* themſelves. If ſo, how are they diſtinguiſht?

And there appears great reaſon, *from God's own Word*, to conceive greater diſtinction of the *three Hypoſtaſes* in his Being, than of the *Attributes* which are common to them, as is ſaid, *Sob. Enq. pag.* 140. In reference whereto, it is not improper or impertinent to mention ſuch Differences, as we find *in our own Being*, tho they be not *diſtinct Subſtances.*

Leſs

Leſs diſtinction in our ſelves may lead us to conceive the poſſibility of greater in him, in whom we are wont to apprehend nothing but Subſtance.

What he adds concerning *the Union of Soul and Body* in our ſelves, (which he cannot deny to be diſtinct Subſtances) is, from a Man of ſo good ſenſe, ſo ſurpriſingly ſtrange, and remote from the Purpoſe, that one would ſcarce think it from the ſame Man; but that he left this part to ſome other of the Club, and afterwards writ on, himſelf, without reading it over; or this was with him (what we are all liable to) ſome drowſy Interval.

For when he had himſelf recited as *the Enquirer's* words, or ſenſe, *If there is this Union between two ſo contrary Natures and Subſtances, as the Soul and Body, why may there not be a like Union between two or three created Spirits?* He, without ſhadow of a pretence, feigns the *Enquirer* again to have forgot the Queſtion, becauſe *Soul and Body are not both intelligent*

Subſtances. And why, Sir, doth this argue him to have forgot the Queſtion? 'Tis as if he expected a Man to be at the top of the Stairs, aſſoon as he toucht the firſt Step. In a Series of Diſcourſe, muſt the beginning touch the end, leaving out what is to come between, and connect both parts? What then ſerve *Mediums* for? And ſo farewel to all reaſoning, ſince nothing can be proved by it ſelf. He expected, it ſeems, I ſhould have proved *three intelligent Natures might be united*, becauſe *three intelligent Natures might be united!*

But ſay I (and ſo he repeats) if there be ſo near Union *between things of ſo contrary Natures as Soul and Body, why not between two or three created Spirits?* The Queſtion is, as he now ſtates it himſelf, why may not three intelligent Subſtances----be united? And hither he (with palpable violence) *immediately* refers the mention of the *Union of Soul and Body*; and ſays he, *Why Sir, are Body and Soul intelligent Subſtances?* And, ſay I, but why,

Sir,

Sir, are not the three (ſuppoſed) created Spirits intelligent Subſtances? And now, thinks he, will my eaſy admiring Readers, that read me only, and not him, ſay, What a Baffle hath he given the Enquirer? What an ignorant Man is this Mr. ---- to talk of Soul and Body, as both intelligent Subſtances? But if any of them happen upon the *Enquirer's Book* too, then muſt they ſay, how ſcurvily doth this Matter turn upon himſelf? How inconſiderate a *Prevaricator* was he that took upon him the preſent part of a *Conſiderer*, ſo to repreſent him? And I my ſelf would ſay, had I the opportunity of free Diſcourſe with him in a Corner, (which becauſe I have not, I ſay it *here*) Sir, is this ſincere Writing? Is this the way to ſift out Truth? And I muſt further ſay, this looks like a Man ſtung by the pungency of the preſent Queſtion. *If Soul and Body, things of ſo contrary Natures, that is, of an intelligent and unintelligent Nature, can be united into one (humane) Nature, why may not three cre-*

ated Spirits, all intelligent Natures, be as well united into ſome one thing? It appears you knew not what to ſay to it; and would fain ſeem to ſay ſomething, when you really had nothing to ſay, and therefore ſo egregiouſly tergiverſate, and feign your ſelf not to underſtand it, or that *your Antagoniſt* did not underſtand himſelf. The *Enquirer's* Scope was manifeſt. Nothing was to be got by ſo groſly perverting it. Is there no Argument but *à pari?* Might you not plainly ſee, he *here* argued *à fortiori? If contrary Natures might be ſo united, why not much rather like Natures?*

When you ask me this Queſtion, *Do not Body and Soul remain two Subſtances, a bodily, and a ſpiritual, notwithſtanding their concurrence to the Conſtitution of a Man?* I anſwer, Yes. And I thank you, Sir, for this kind Look towards *my Hypotheſis.* If they were not ſo, the mention of *this Union* had no way ſerv'd it. You know 'tis only *Union*, with *continuing diſtinction*, that is for my purpoſe. I doubt

doubt you nodded a little, when you ask'd me that Queſtion; and I do *annuere*.

But when the Diſcourſe was only of a *natural Union*, what, in the Name of Wonder, made you dream of a *Chriſtmaſs-Pye*? Had you writ it at the ſame time of Year I am now writing, I ſhould have wondered leſs. But either you had ſome particular, preternatural Appetite to that ſort of Delicate; or you gave your Fancy a random liberty, to make your Pen write whatever came to your fingers end, and that whirl'd you unaware into a *Paſtry*, and ſo, by meer chance, you came to have your finger in the Pye. Or you thought to try whether this wild Ramble might not iſſue as luckily for you, as Dr. *Echard*'s Jargon of Words fortuitouſly put together (to ridicule *Hobbes*'s fatal Chain of Thoughts) at length ending in a *Napkin*; which was mightily for your turn, in your preſent Caſe.

But upon the whole Matter, when you let *your Mind* ſo unwarily be *in patinis*, your *Cookery* quite ſpoil'd your *Philoſophy*. Otherwiſe, when you had newly read thoſe words in the *Sob. Enquiry*, (as I find you had) *pag.* 17. [*Waving the many artificial Unions of diſtinct things, that united, and continuing diſtinct, make one thing, under one Name, I ſhall only conſider what is Natural*] you would never have let it (*your Mind*, I mean ſo fine a thing) be huddled up, and ſopt, with Meat, Plums, Sugar, Wine, in a *Chriſtmaſs*-Pye; or have thought that the Union of an humane Soul with an humane Body was like ſuch a jumble as this. I believe when ſome among the *Antients* made uſe of this *Union of Soul and Body*, (as I find they have) to repreſent a very ſacred, *viz.* the Hypoſtatical One, they little thought it would be ſo debaſed; or that any thing would be ſaid of it ſo extravagant as this. And, if we deſign doing any Body good by writing, let us give over this way of Talk, leſt People think,

what

what I remember *Cicero* once ſaid of the *Epicureans* arguing, that they do not ſo much conſider, as (*ſortiri*) caſt Lots what to ſay.

But now 'tis like we may come to ſome cloſer Diſcourſe. We ſee what is ſaid to the *Enquirer's* Elucidation of his *Hypotheſis* to *repreſent it poſſible*, which by meer Overſight and Incogitance (as I hope now appears) was too haſtily pronounced an *Overſight, or Incogitancy.*

2. We are next to conſider what he ſays *to prove it impoſſible.* And ſo far as I can apprehend the drift of the Diſcourſe, what he alledges will be reduced to theſe two Heads of Argument.

Viz. That *three ſuch Hypoſtaſes* (or *Subſiſtents*, as I have choſen to call them) can have no poſſible *Nexus*, by which to be one God.

1. Becauſe they are all ſuppoſed intelligent.

2. Becauſe they can neither be ſaid to be finite, nor infinite.

He

He ſhould not therefore have ſaid the *Hypotheſis* was meer incogitance and overſight; for he knows I ſaw, and conſidered them both. (In the *Sob. Enquiry* it ſelf; the former *pag.* 20, 21. the latter *pag.* 70, 71. with *pag.* 122, 123.) And thought them unconcluding then, as I ſtill think. Nor do I find the *Conſiderer* hath now added any ſtrength to either of them. But I ſhall, ſince he is importune, go to the reconſideration of them with him. And

1. As to the former, I cannot ſo much as imagine what ſhould make him, confeſſing (which he could not help) the *actual Union* of an *intelligent and unintelligent Being*, deny the *poſſible Union* of intelligent Beings. He ſeems to apprehend many *dangerous things* in it, that if he cannot *reaſon*, he may *fright* a Man out of it, and out of his Wits too. It will infer *aſſociating*, *diſcourſing*, *ſolacing*. But where lies the danger of all this? Or to whom is it dangerous? He ſays it introduces *three Omniſcient*, *Almighty* Beings,

Beings, as I expreſly call them, *aſſociating*, &c. But he cites no place where, and I challenge him to name any Perſons among whom, I ſo *expreſly called* them. He may indeed tell where I blam'd him for repreſenting ſome of his Adverſaries, as affirming *three Almighties*, and *denying more than One*; but that is not expreſly calling them ſo my ſelf. And he may know in time 'tis one thing expreſly to call them ſo, and another to put him (as he is concerned) to diſprove it.

Ay, but it will further infer *Tritheiſm*. It will make *three Gods*. And if this be not to make three Gods, *it can never be made appear that the Pagans held more Gods* ----Yes, if there be no natural, vital *Nexus*, if they be not *united in One*, of which the *Pagans* never talkt: Or, if they be *co-ordinate*, not *ſubordinate*, as Dr. *Cudworth* ſpeaks. And I add, if that *ſubordination* be, *not arbitrary*, but by *neceſſary*, *natural*, *continual emanation* of the *ſecond* from the *firſt*, and of the *third* from

from *both* the *other*; so as that their *goings forth* may be truly *from everlasting*, as is said of the One, and may as well be conceived of *another* of them.

I would have the *Trinitarians* be content with the *Reproach* of falling in, *quoad hoc*, with *Plato*; and not envy their *Antagonists* the honour of more closely following *Mahomet*. And, Sir, there is more *Paganism* in denying this, and the *Divine Revelation* upon which it is grounded, than in supposing it.

No. But there can be no such *Nexus*. *Conversation, Consociation, mutual Harmony, Agreement, and Delectation---cannot be conceived, but between Beings so distinct and diverse, that they can be One in no Natural respect, but only in a Civil, or Oeconomical.* This is *loud*, and *earnest*. But why can there not? Setting aside *Noise* and *Clamour*, I want to know a *Reason*, why intelligent Beings may not be as intimately, and naturally united with one another, as *unintelligent*, and *intelligent*? And if so, why *such Union* should spoil

mutual

mutual Converſation and *Delight*? Perhaps *his Mind* and *mine* might not do well together; for he cannot conceive, and I, for my part, cannot but conceive, that moſt perfect intelligent Natures, vitally united, muſt have the moſt delightful Converſation, Harmony, and Agreement together; and ſo much the more, by how much the more perfect they are, and by how much more perfect their Union is.

Whereas then I expect a *Reaſon*, why *intelligent Beings* cannot be capable of *natural Union*, and no other is given me, but *becauſe they are intelligent*. And again, why ſuch Beings *naturally united* cannot converſe, and no other is given me, but becauſe they are *naturally united*, i. e. Such things cannot be, becauſe they cannot be. By how much the leſs ſuch Reaſons have to *convince*, they have the more to *confirm* me, that the *Hypotheſis* I have propos'd is not capable of being diſproved. And for my increaſed Confidence I muſt profeſs my

ſelf

ſelf ſo far beholden to the *Conſiderator.*

This, in the mean time, I do here declare, that I ſee not ſo much as the ſhadow of a Reaſon from him, why *three ſpiritual*, or *intelligent Beings* cannot be *naturally* and *vitally united* with each other, with *continuing diſtinction*, ſo as to be really and truly *One thing*. If they cannot, I would know why? *i. e.* Why they cannot as well, or much rather than the *Soul and Body*, ſo as to be one *entire Man*. If they can, ſuch a created Union is acknowledged poſſible; which is all that part of our Diſcourſe contends for. And 'tis enough for our preſent purpoſe; for this will be an Union of ὁμοίοπα, *i. e.* of things of the ſame nature, the Soul and Body are ἑτεροίοπα, *i. e.* things of very different Natures. And it ſufficiently prepared our way, as was intended, to advance further, and add,

That if ſuch a *created or made Union* be poſſible, it cannot be underſtood why a like

like *uncreated or unmade Union* ſhould be thought impoſſible.

And if it be poſſible, the noiſy Clamour, that a *Trinity in the Godhead is impoſſible*, or that it will infer *Tritheiſm*, muſt ceaſe, and be huſht into everlaſting ſilence. Or if it ſhall ſtill be reſolved to be kept up, to carry on the begun Humour, can only ſerve to fright Children, or unthinking People; but can never be made articulate enough, to have any ſignification with Men of ſenſe.

For when the Father is acknowledg'd on all hands to be the Original, or Fountain-Being, exiſting neceſſarily, and eternally of himſelf; the Son exiſting by eternal Promanation neceſſarily of, and from, and in the Father; the Holy Ghoſt of, and in them both; *Theſe, becauſe they all exiſt neceſſarily, cannot* but be *each of them God*, and, *becauſe they exiſt in neceſſary, natural, eternal Union*, cannot but be *one God*.

And he that ſhall attempt to make *Tritheiſm* of this, will ſooner prove himſelf

himſelf not the *third part* of a wiſe Man, than from hence prove *three Gods*. We may truly and fitly ſay *the Father is God*, the *Son is God*, the *Holy Ghoſt is God*. But *that form of Speech*, the *Father is a God*, the *Son is a God*, the *Holy Ghoſt is a God*, I think unjuſtifiable. The former way of ſpeaking well agrees with the *Homoouſiotes* of the Deity, the *Subſtance* whereof is *congenerous*. You may fitly ſay of three drops of the ſame Water, they are each of them *Water*. But if you ſhould ſay they are each of them *a Water*, one would underſtand you to mean they were all drops of ſo many different ſorts of Water. I do upon the whole judg the Subſtance or Eſſence of the *three Hypoſtaſes* to be as perfectly *One*, as can poſſibly conſiſt with the emanation of *ſome* from *other* of them. But now next.

In his way to his *ſecond Topick* of Argumentation, he is guilty of a ſtrange ſort of omiſſion, *i. e.* he twice over ſays *he will omit*, what he greatly inſiſts upon, as a mighty matter, that *this* (meaning

the

the Enquirer's Hypotheſis) is *Hereſy* among thoſe of his own Party, whether they be the *nominal*, or the *real Trinitarians*, who all agree, That each of the Divine Perſons is *perfect God*, in the moſt adequate and perfect ſenſe; and this too, as *ſuch Perſon is conſidered* ſejunctly, *or as the* Athanaſian *Creed ſpeaks, by himſelf*, &c.

To this I only ſay, in *the firſt place*, that, if this weigh any thing, it ought in reaſon to be as heavy upon him, as me; for I believe the ſame People that will call *this account of the Trinity Hereſy*, will call his denial of it *Hereſy* much more. But if he be not concern'd at that, I am the more obliged to him, that he hath a kinder concern for me than himſelf. And if he really have, let it eaſe his mind to know, that let the Opinion be *Hereſy* never ſo much, I, for my part, am however reſolv'd to be no *Heretick*, as he, and they may well enough ſee, by the whole tenour of *that Diſcourſe*.

But yet I humbly crave leave to differ from him *in this*, as well as *in greater Matters*. I am apt enough indeed to think that the *Nominal Trinitarians* will judg the Opinion of the *Real Trinitarians* to want *Truth*; and the *Real* will, perhaps, more truly judg *theirs* to want *Senſe*. But neither the one, nor the other will ſay that *each of the Divine Perſons is perfect God, in the moſt adequate and perfect ſenſe*. For *both* cannot but agree that *God*, in the *moſt adequate and perfect ſenſe*, includes *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghoſt*; but they will none of them ſay that *each*, or *any* of the Perſons is *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghoſt*. And I am very confident, he that ſhall ſo repreſent them, will betray them by it into ſuch inconveniencies, and ſo much againſt their mind and intent, that if ever they did truſt him, as I believe they never did *this Conſiderator*, to expreſs their ſenſe for them, they never will do it more. As for *Athanaſius* himſelf, whoſe *Creed* he mentions, tho he often ſpeaks of an *equality of*

the

the Perſons in point of *Godhead*; yet he alſo often, *Tom.* 2. *p.* 576. moſt expreſly excepts the Differences (which I take to be very important) of *being unbegotten, begotten, and proceeding.* And which is a Difference with a Witneſs, *in his Queſtions and Anſwers*; He asks *how many Cauſes are there in God?* [(*Q.* 11.) πόσα ἄιτια,] and anſwers, *One only*, and that is the Father. And then asks [*Q.* 12. πόσα ἀιτιάτα] How many effects, or things cauſed? And anſwers *two*, the *Son* and *the Spirit.* And adds, *The Father is call'd a Cauſe, becauſe he begets the Son, and ſends out the Spirit. The Son and Spirit are ſaid to be cauſed, becauſe the Son is begotten, and doth not beget; the Spirit is ſent forth, and doth not ſend.* Now can he be thought all this while to mean *an abſolute equality*? And whereas he uſes the Term μοναδικῶς, which our Author renders *ſejunctly*, or *by himſelf*, that he may make it ſeem oppoſite to what is ſaid by *the Enquirer*, *pag.* 50. I, for my part, ſay, as *Athanaſius* doth, that each

of theſe Perſons is μοναδικῶς, ſingly *God*, and *Lord*; but I ſay not, as he doth not; and he denies what the *Sober Enquiry* denies, in the mentioned place, *That any one of the Perſons ſejunctly*, is *all that is ſignify'd by the Name of God*, which words this Author ſlily leaves out, for what purpoſe he beſt knows. But his purpoſe, be it what it will, can no longer be ſerved by it, than till *the Reader* ſhall take the pains to caſt back his Eye upon *pag.* 50. of the *Sober Enquiry*. And I muſt here put the *Conſiderator* in mind of what I will not ſuppoſe him ignorant, but inadvertent only, at this time; That one may be *ſejoin'd*, or *abſtracted* from another *two ways*, or by a twofold *abſtraction*, *preciſive*, or *negative*. That we may truly ſay of the *Father*, *Son*, or *Holy Ghoſt*, that the *One* of them is, or is not God, abſtracting from both the other, according as you differently abſtract. If you abſtract any one of the Perſons from both the other by *preciſive abſtraction*, and each of them is *God* or *Lord*,

Lord, μοναδικῶς, or ſingly conſidered; but if by *negative abſtraction* you ſever any one from the other, ſo as to ſay the one is God, and not the other, or any one is all that is ſignify'd by the Name of God, I deny it, as before I did; for ſo you would exclude the other two the Godhead; which is but what was expreſly enough ſaid *Sob. Enquiry*, pag. 47. *The Father is God, but not excluding the Son and the Holy Ghoſt, the Son is God, but not excluding*---&c.

And if (as this Author quotes) *we are compelled by the Chriſtian Verity ſo to ſpeak*, I wonder it ſhould not compel him, as it is *Chriſtian Verity*, or at leaſt as it is *Verity*, as well as the reſt of *Chriſtians*, or *Mankind*. Why hath he only the privilege of exemption from being compell'd by truth? *Athanaſius* his word is ἀναγκαζόμεθα, we are neceſſitated; and if the *Conſiderator's* own Tranſlation grieve him, he might relieve himſelf by conſidering that *all Neceſſity is not compulſive*.

And becauſe he hath brought me to *Athanaſius*, I ſhall take the occaſion to ſay, I cannot apprehend him to have any ſentiment contrary to this *Hypotheſis*. His buſineſs was againſt the *Arians*, or the *Ariomanites* (as he often called them, as ſymbolizing alſo with *Manes*.) And becauſe *with them* the Controverſy was, whether *the Son and Spirit were Creatures*, in oppoſition hereto he conſtantly aſſerts *their conſubſtantiality with the Father*, never intending (for ought that appears) that their Being was *numerically* the ſame with his; but of the *ſame kind*, uncreated, coeſſential, coeternal with his own.

Quæſtiones aliæ. For ſo he expreſly ſpeaks in his *other* (or additional) *Queſtions*, *i. e.* asking (*Queſt.* 6.) *How many Eſſences* πόσας ὐσίας, *i. e.* How many ſorts of Eſſence (as the Anſwer will direct us to underſtand it) *do you acknowledg in God?*

The Anſwer is, I ſay, *one Eſſence*, *one Nature*, *one Form* (μορφῶ) and adds, *one Kind*, (ἓν γένῳ) which ſufficiently expounds

pounds all the reſt. He acknowledged no different *kinds* of Eſſence or Nature in the Godhead, but *that One only*, which was *eternal* and *uncreated*; agreeably to what he elſewhere ſays againſt the *Followers* of *Sabellius*. *'Tis impoſſible things not eternal--Beings not partaking Godhead, ſhould be ranked, or put in the ſame order with the Godhead.* Afterwards ſpeaking of the *Father* and the *Son*, he ſays, τοιοῦτος ἐστιν οἷος κἀκεῖνος, the One *is ſuch* (not the ſame) as the *other*, the *other ſuch* as he. And that the *Son* was not to be conceived under *another Species* (καθ' ἕτερον εἶδος) nor under a ſtrange and foreign Character (ξένον χαρακτῆρα) but was *God* as the Father. And I appeal to any Man's Underſtanding and Conſcience, If that great Author believ'd a *numerical ſameneſs of Eſſence*, common to the three Perſons, what ſhould make him blame the *Sabellians* for making the Son μονοούσιον, not ὁμοούσιον, when by *the latter* in

Contra Sabellii Gregales.

Εκθ. πιϛ. *Tom.* 1. *p.* 241. *Edit. Pariſ.*

that caſe, he muſt mean the ſame thing as by *the former* ?

In the forecited *Queſtions*, he expreſly ſays we were to acknowledg in the Deity τρία ἄτομα, three Individuals. Anſwer to *Queſt.* 7. *ubi priùs*.

And elſewhere he as diſtinctly aſſerts τρία πρόγματα, *three things*. And what could he mean by *three things*, not *three Deities*, (as he often inculcates) but he muſt certainly mean *three Entities*, *three Eſſences*; for by *three things*, he could not poſſibly mean three *Non-Entities*, or *three Nothings*. His great care plainly was to aſſert the *true Deity* of the *Son* and *Spirit*, or their Preeternity, or that it could never be ſaid (ὧν ὅτε οὐκ ὧν) there was a time when they were not, which he inculcates in an hundred places, ſtill inſiſting that *one Deity*, *one Eſſence* was common to them, but ſtill with diſtinction; and as warmly inveighs againſt *Sabellius* and *P. Samoſatenſis*, as againſt *Arius* every whit.

And

And that which puts his meaning quite out of doubt, ſpeaking how the *Father*, *Son* and *Spirit*, tho of one and the ſame ſort of Eſſence, are *three Hypoſtaſes*, he plainly ſays the Nature wherein they partake *is ſo One, as the humane Nature is One in all Men.* We *Men*, ſaith he, conſiſting of a Body and a Soul, are all (μίας φύσεως, ἢ οὐσίας) *of one Nature and Subſtance, or Eſſence; but we are many Hypoſtaſes.* And to the ſame purpoſe [*Dial.* 2. *de Trinitate*] his *Anomœos* comparing the *Father*, *Son* and *Spirit*, to a *Biſhop*, *Presbyter*, and *Deacon*, he brings in *the Orthodox* ſaying, *they have all the ſame Nature, being each of them* Man; *as an* Angel, *a* Man, *and an* Horſe, *have different Natures.*

Tractat. de Definitionibus, Tom. 2. 45. *ubi vid. plura.*

In the mean time, becauſe Men are not inſeparably, and vitally united with one another, as the *Divine Perſons* are, and cannot but be, by reaſon of the neceſſary, eternal, perpetual emanation of the two latter from the firſt, they cannot

not admit to be called *one Man*, as the three Perſons in the Godhead, are and cannot but be *one God*. Inaſmuch as theſe three Divine Perſons partake real Godhead (as exiſting neceſſarily each of them) they are each truly God: but becauſe they partake it in neceſſary, eternal, vital Union; and ſo that the *firſt* is the *radix*, the ſecond perpetually ſpringing from the firſt, and the third from both the other, they are therefore together *one God* As Branches, tho really diſtinct from *each other*, and the *Root*, are altogether notwithſtanding but *one Tree*, and all *omoouſial*, or *conſubſtantial* to one another; which is an illuſtration familiar with the the *Antients*.

And if there be any, now a days, that will call this *Hereſy*, (tho as I ſaid, I will be no Heretick however) yet if I muſt make a choice, I had rather be an Heretick with the *Ante-Nicene* and *Nicene* Fathers, and *Poſt-Nicene*, for ought appears to the contrary, through ſome following Centuries, than be reputed Orthodox

thodox with P. *Lumbard*, &c. whom a *German* Divine, not of meaneſt account, calls *one of the four Evangeliſts of Antichriſt.*

But having now done with what he ſaid he would omit, but did not, (tho he might to every whit as good purpoſe) we come to what he overlooks not, becauſe (he intimates) *he cannot.* And let us ſee whether he *looks into it*, to any better purpoſe, than if he had *quite overlook'd it.* He is indeed the more excuſable that he overlooks it not, becauſe (he ſays) *he could not.* In that caſe there is no remedy. Nor do I ſee how he well could, when the *Sober Enquirer* had once and again ſo directly put it in his view, and, as was ſaid, objected it to himſelf.

But he thinks, however, to make an irrefragable Battering Ram of it, wherewith to ſhiver this Doctrine of *the Trinity* all to pieces, and he brings it into play with the two Horns before mentioned.

The

The Father, he ſays, for inſtance, is either *infinite in his Subſtance, his Wiſdom, his Power, his Goodneſs, or he is not.*

With the like pompous *apparatus*, and even in the *ſame Terms*, I find a *ſeries* of Argumentation is by a noted *Sceptick* adorned, and ſet forth *againſt the Being of any God at all.*

εἰ ἔστι τι θεῖον, ἤτοι περιεγραμμένον ἢ ἄπειρον, &c. *Sext. Empir. adverſus Mathematicos*, Lib. 8.

If there be any Divine Being, 'tis either Finite or Infinite, &c.

And he reaſons upon *each Head*, as the Matter could admit, and probably thought as well of the Performance as our Author doth of his.

But let us ſee how much to the purpoſe our Author uſes it in the preſent caſe.

The Enquirer had repreſented three really diſtinct *Subſiſtents* in the Godhead *as poſſible*, for ought we know, not preſuming to determine herein, this way or that, beyond what is plain in it ſelf, or plainly revealed. And ſo ſtill he thinks it

it may be, *for ought he knows*; for he profeſſes not to know any thing to the contrary. Yes (ſaith the Conſiderator) but I do. No doubt, if any Man. But ſay I, how know you? I know, ſaith he, they can neither *be finite*, nor *infinite*, therefore there can be no ſuch thing at all.

But, ſay I, Do you know what *infinite* is, or can you comprehend it? Yes, very well, ſays he; for I have an infinite all-comprehending Mind. What a Cyclopick underſtanding is this? Nay, and he pretends he can comprehend the *very Being of God* (otherwiſe all Religion muſt ceaſe) after he had granted, *we* (including himſelf) *cannot comprehend the leaſt ſpire of Graſs*. And yet that *Being of God* is nothing elſe with him, but *Exiſtence*, (i. e. *not to be nothing*) which he there vafrouſly inſerts, but very imprudently; for every one ſees he ſaid it only to avoid the purpoſe he was to ſpeak to, and

Conſiderations on the Lord Biſhop of Worceſter's *Sermon*, p. 7, 8.

ſo

ſo ſaid it not to any preſent good purpoſe at all? As if it had been the *Biſhop's* word, and all one with *God's Being*. 'Tis true that *his Being* includes *his Exiſtence*: But hath he therefore a clear, diſtinct and adequate conception *what God is*, becauſe he, indiſtinctly, conceives a Being, vulgarly ſignify'd by the Name of God, *doth exiſt*? Bring the matter to Creatures, and becauſe he knows, as he may by the ſight of his Eye, that ſuch a Creature exiſts, doth he therefore underſtand its Nature? *Exiſtence* is to be *extra cauſas*, and this is common to all Creatures; as to be neceſſarily, and without a cauſe, is peculiar to God. If therefore *Exiſtence*, and *their Being* be all one, *all Creatures* are the ſame, and differ not from one another; for to be *extra cauſas* is that wherein they all agree. And extend it further, as Exiſtence is *to be*, *in rerum naturâ*, abſtracting from being *cauſed*, or *uncauſed*; and ſo *God*, and *Creatures* will be all one. And ſee whether

ther this will not make all Religion ceaſe too?

But if he ſay, tho *Exiſtence* abſtractly taken, diſtinguiſhes not God from Creatures; yet *his* Exiſtence doth diſtinguiſh him. Very true; but that leads us back to the Conſideration of *his Being*, of what *ſort that is*. Which therefore, if he had pleaſed, he might as well have let ſtand before as it was; and might have conſidered that *Exiſtence*, and *that which doth exiſt*, are not of the ſame import. Or that it is not all one, to ſay *that God doth exiſt*, and *what he is* that doth *exiſt*.

But it will be worth the while to examine a little further *this Author's comprehenſion of Infinites*. He ſays it is to have a clear, diſtinct, and adequate conception of them, ſo he comprehends the infinite Attributes of God. His Eternity, i. e. *that Duration, by which he is without all beginning, and end.* This tells us what it is not. But doth it tell us what it is? *q. d.* An infinite Duration is a bound-

boundleſs Duration: A Grammatical Definition! Or rather a meer Tranſlation of *Latin* into *Engliſh*. And ſo he might teach a *meer Latiniſt* what *boundleſs* is, by turning the *Engliſh* back again into *Latin*. And greatly hath he edify'd his Diſciple! As much as he ſhould, without ſuch change of Language, by ſaying *Invaſion* is *Invaſion*. And doth he give any better account of infinite *Wiſdom* and *Power*? Are his Conceptions of them *clear* and *diſtinct*. 'Tis poſſible to *know much*, and not be very *wiſe*. I do not think *that* therefore, *which he gives*, a very good account of *Wiſdom*. Again, *knowing* is *doing* ſomewhat. He ſpeaks not now of *making* this or that, but more generally of *doing any thing*. Nor doth any one know any thing, but what he *can* know. Therefore his *Wiſdom* is *Power*; for ſo is an ability *to know*, *Power*, as truly, as an ability *to do* any thing elſe. Here is confuſion, therefore, inſtead of diſtinction. And to the comprehending any thing, I ſhould think it as

as requiſite a Man's Conception be *true*, as *diſtinct*. Now when he pretends to have diſtinct Conceptions of God's infinite *Wiſdom* and *Power*, if alſo his Conceptions be true, thoſe infinite Attributes are diſtinct. I am ſure he comprehends them not, if, whereas he clearly conceives them diſtinct, they are not ſo. But if they are diſtinct, they are diſtinct, what? Subſtances? or Accidents? If the former, according to him, *diſtinct Divine Subſtances* muſt be *diſtinct Gods*. If the latter, let him weather the Difficulties as he can of admitting Accidents in the Divine Being. Either way, he muſt as little pretend to believe an *ommimodous ſimplicity there*, as the *Enquirer*. But would he then have *him* give better and fuller Conceptions of theſe infinite Attributes, or rather *of the Infinity of them*, which is his preſent buſineſs? No, no, that is none of the *Enquirer's* part. He pretends not to comprehend Infiniteneſs. 'Tis enough for *One*, among Mortals, to offer at

(that *ingens auſum*) ſo great a thing!

When again he ſays his Conception of the *Infinite Divine Wiſdom, Power,* &c. *is adequate*, telling us they are *thoſe Properties whereby God knows, and can do, whatſoever implies not a contradiction to be known, and done*: I ask, but doth he comprehend in his Mind all thoſe things which it implies not a contradiction for him to know and do? If not, what is become of his adequate Conception? He may ſo comprehend all that the moſt learned Book contains, becauſe he knows the Title, or ſomething of its Cover; and he hath a very adequate Conception of all that is contained in the Univerſe, becauſe he hath ſome general notion of what is ſignify'd by the word *World*. Let him then pretend as long as he pleaſe to comprehend *Infiniteneſs*, no ſober Man will believe him, and the leſs, *becauſe he pretends it*. If he put his Mind upon the trial, and deal juſtly and truly when he hath try'd, I would ask him, let him put the Notion of Infiniteneſs upon what

what he pleaſes, *Space*, for inſtance, whether, *as* he thinks away any whatſoever bounds of it, new ones do not immediately ſucceed? And let him think away thoſe, whether ſtill he doth not preſently conceive new? Yes, but he can divert and think no more of it, *i.e.* he can think what Infinite is, by not thinking! And yet if he did underſtand Infinites never ſo well, it would be no ſmall ſpite to him if a Man did but aſſert the Infiniteneſs of one of the Perſons (the Father), and only ἐπέχειν as to the other two, as knowing their intimate Union *with him*, makes his Wiſdom, Power, *&c. as truly theirs*, as if it *firſt* reſided in *themſelves*; his Argument is quite undone by it to all intents and purpoſes.

But I ſhall however, farther ſtate and weigh this caſe of [knowing, or not knowing, *three ſuch Hypoſtaſes* cannot be infinite.] And

1. Shew what might caſt a thinking Man upon, ſuppoſing they may be all infinite *for ought one knows*.

 2. Then

2. Then conſider the difficulty that is in it.

1. As to the former. That the *Father virtually* (or *eminently* rather) comprehends *all being*, *created* and *uncreated*, there is no doubt. Nor again, that *what is from him*, by *perpetual*, *natural*, *neceſſary Emanation*, cannot but be *homoouſial* to himſelf, the *Athanaſian Differences* only ſuppoſed, of being *unbegotten*, and *begotten*, &c. But how to underſtand *theſe* is the difficulty; *i. e.* How the *ſame numerical Nature* is both *begotten*, and *not begotten*; nor will I determine it. Let them do it that can better. I, for my part, as I have ſaid, aſſert nothing *in this matter*, only have propoſed to be conſidered what may be *thought poſſible herein*.

But if any would ſet themſelves to conſider this matter, I would have them take the difficulty they are to conſider, entirely, and as it truly is in it ſelf; that they may not be ſhort in their reckoning. And to that purpoſe to bethink them-

themſelves what is the *proper Character* (as *Athanaſius*, and before him *Juſtin Martyr* phraſe it) or *Modus of the Son* (for inſtance) that 'tis *to be begotten.* This methinks ſhould bear very hard upon the *meer Modaliſts*, who hereupon muſt ſay, that to *be begotten* is the only thing begotten, and ſo conſequently that *to be begotten*, is the thing that is peculiarly ſaid to be incarnate, and *that ſuffered*, &c. For they muſt aſſign that which diſtinguiſhes the *Son* from the *Father*, otherwiſe they will make the *Father* be *begotten*, which is ſomewhat harder than to be *Patripaſſians*, or to make him to have ſuffered.

But it muſt alſo be upon the matter even the ſame difficulty, to ſay, *the ſame numerical Nature, with the Modus, is begotten.* For then the ſame numerical Nature muſt ſtill be both *unbegotten*, and *begotten*, which is very hard. And if they reply, Yes, but *under a diſtinct Modus.* Well; but *what is that diſtinct Modus?* And when they find it is *but to be*

begotten, they muſt be hugely abaſhed, as one of leſs deep Thought than they would think. For ſo, the Nature being common both to the *Father* and the *Son*, all that is peculiar *to the begotten*, from *the Begetter*, will ſtill be but *to be begotten*, *i. e.* When the Queſtion is askt, What only is begotten? the Anſwer will be but as above, *to be begotten*. It hath hitherto, therefore, been only enquired, Whether it will not ſeem eaſier to ſuppoſe *each Subſiſtent* to have its own *ſingular Nature*, tho *Homoouſial*, as, the *two latter* being by *emanation* from the *firſt*, it cannot but be? Which hath been often inculcated, and is plain in it ſelf. *Meer arbitrary Productions* may be very diverſe from their *Original*, but *purely natural*, eſpecially emanative, cannot be ſo. And then the only conſiderable difficulty which remains is this now before us, *viz.* The *finiteneſs* or *infiniteneſs* of theſe *three Hypoſtaſes*: 'Tis plain they cannot be *all finite*. But *here* our *preſent Adverſary* places his principal pains, and labour,

to

to prove, what he knows no Body will deny, that they cannot be ſo. And hence he carries away glorious Trophies, *That three, or three thouſand finites, will never make one infinite.* ———Spolia ampla——!

But how knows he they are not all Infinite? *That*, in ſhort, which he hath *here* to ſay, is but this, and can be no more than this, till his Thoughts have run through and compaſs'd the never-utmoſt range of *Infiniteneſs*, *viz.* That *he knows they are not, he knows not what!* But how can he ſoberly ſay that? How can he either affirm or deny of another what he doth not underſtand? Is this his demonſtration of the impoſſibility of a Trinity in the Godhead? Suppoſe the *Father infinite*, cannot the *other two* be infinite alſo, for ought he knows? How doth he know they cannot? By the *ſame medium*, by which he knows it, he may make *other Mortals* know it too, if he think fit to communicate it. Which, from ſo mighty Confidence, eſpecially

when he pretends it to be ſo eaſy, I have hitherto expected, but in vain. Is it becauſe the *firſt* is infinite, therefore the *two other* cannot be ſo? I am ſure *he* ought not to ſay ſo, whatever *others* may, or whatſoever the truth of the thing is (which we ſhall enquire into by and by) for he hath over and over acknowledg'd *more Infinites than one*. As when he aſcribes *infinite Comprehenſion* to the Mind of Man (as hath been noted, *pag.* 8. of theſe *Conſiderations*) he doth not indeed ſay the Mind is *ſimply in it ſelf infinite*, but it is ſo *in reſpect of its Comprehenſion*, which *Comprehenſion* muſt therefore be infinite. How agreeable or conſiſtent theſe Terms are, *the infinite Comprehenſion of a finite Mind, we are not to conſider*; let *him* take care for that, who can eaſily make light of ſuch trivial Difficulties as theſe. But in the mean time this infinite Comprehenſion is an infinite ſomething, not an infinite nothing; and then ſo many Minds, ſo many *Comprehenſions*, and ſo many *Infinites*.

nites. No doubt he includes his own Mind; and 'tis poſſible he may think ſome other Minds as comprehenſive as his own. And ought not to think it impoſſible, ſuppoſing an uncreated, eternal *Word*, and *Spirit*, in the Deity, that they may be *infinite*, as well *as the comprehenſion of his own* and ſome other *Minds*. Beſides what he ſeems to grant of infinite *Guilts*, and *Puniſhments due*, tho he doth not grant the Sacrifice of Chriſt to be an equivalent for them. All ſhews *he thinks* there may be many *Infinites*, and *even in the ſame kind.*

Theſe Conſiderations, p. 31, 32.

But tho to him, to whom it is not eaſy to gueſs what would be difficult, this would ſeem a very vincible Difficulty; it is of much greater importance, that we may *do right to Truth*, to conſider it, *as it is in it ſelf.* And I acknowledg it (as I have ſaid over and over) to be *in it ſelf*, a great difficulty, as all ſober Men have been wont to do, that have had

had any occaſion to employ their thoughts that way.

But my part herein hath leſs of difficulty in it; which is only to expect, and examine, what *another* will attempt to prove from *this Topick*, not to aſſert any thing my ſelf. My Opponent takes upon him boldly to pronounce, *there cannot be three diſtinct Hypoſtaſes in the Deity*. Why? ſay I. Becauſe ſaith he, that will ſuppoſe each of them infinite, which cannot be. I ſay, why can it not be? He perhaps may tell me, if any one be infinite, nothing can be added thereto, or be without its compaſs, much leſs can there be *another Infinite* added to the *former*. I only now ſay, you talk confidently in the dark, you know not what. And ſo as to involve your ſelf in Contradictions, do what you can.

1. In ſaying nothing can be added to what is infinite.

2. In pretending to know, if any thing can be added, how much, or how little can.

1. In

1. In ſaying nothing can be added to, or be without the compaſs of, *what is infinite*. For then there could be no Creation, which I cannot doubt him to grant. Before there was any, was there not an *infinitude of Being* in the *eternal Godhead?* And hath the Creation nothing in it of *real Being?* Or will you ſay the Being of the Creature is the Being of God? I know what may be ſaid (and is elſewhere ſaid) to this, and 'twill better ſerve my purpoſe than *his*.

2. In pretending to know what can, or cannot be added. Or that, *in the way of neceſſary eternal Emanation*, there cannot be an infinite addition; tho *not in the way of voluntary, or arbitrary and temporary production*. The reaſon of the difference is too obvious to need elucidation to them that can conſider. But for your part (I muſt tell my Antagoniſt) you have concluded your ſelf, even as to that which carries the greateſt appearance of impoſſibility, come off as you

you can. You ſay, *a Body of an Inch ſquare*, is not only not infinite in extenſion, but is a very ſmall Body; yet *it hath this infinite power*, to be diviſible to infinity. So, I ſuppoſe, you muſt ſay of *half that Inch*, or a *quarter*, or the *thouſandth part* of it, much more of *two*, or *twenty*, or a *thouſand Inches*. You ſay, indeed, *this Body it ſelf* is not infinite. Nor will I inſiſt upon the trite and common Objection againſt you. *How can any thing be diviſible into parts which it hath not in it?* Which yet Men have not talkt away, by talking it often over. Still *hæret lateri* ---Nor of an *infinite Power's* being lodged in a *finite* (and ſo minute a) Subject. But, in the mean time, here are *Infinites* upon *Infinites*, an *infinite Power* upon an *infinite Power* multiplyed *infinitely*; and ſtill theſe *infinite Powers* greater and leſs than other, as either the Inch is augmented, or diminiſhed. And he ſaith the Mind of Man hath the *Property of infinite or eternal duration*. Therefore

Conſiderations, pag. 8.

Ibid.

fore ſo many Minds, ſo many Infinites. And he muſt ſuppoſe the infinite duration of ſome Minds to be greater than of others, unleſs he think his *own Mind* to be as old as *Adam's*; or do not only hold *their preexiſtence*, but that they were all created *in the ſame moment*. Which if he do, I am ſure he can never prove. And ſo, for ought he knows, there may not only be *many Infinites*, but *one greater than another*.

What therefore exceeds all limits that are aſſignable, or any way conceivable by us, as we are ſure the *Divine Being* doth, it is impoſſible for us to know what differences that *vaſt Infinitude* contains. And we ſhall, therefore, but talk at random, and with much more *preſumption* than *knowledg*, when we take upon us to pronounce it *impoſſible*, *there ſhould be three infinite Hypoſtaſes in the Godhead*. Eſpecially conſidering that moſt intimate vital Union that they are ſuppoſed to have each with other, in reſpect whereof, the *Son* is ſaid to be

ἐνυπόστατος,

ἐνυπόστατον, inexiſting in the Father (as *Athanaſius*'s Phraſe is) agreeably to the Language of Scripture, *Joh.* 14. 11. and elſewhere. And which, by parity of Reaſon, is to be conceiv'd of the Holy Ghoſt too, who is alſo ſaid *to ſearch all things, even the deep things of God*, 1 Cor. 2. 10. In reſpect of which Union, and the ἐμπεριχώρησις, which may thence be collected, whatever of real Perfection, Wiſdom, Power, Goodneſs, *&c.* is in any one, is each ones as truly as any ones, all being originally in the Father, as the firſt and everliving fountain of all. As was ſaid, *Sober Enquiry*, p. 31, 32.

But whereas the *Conſiderator* urges, *If the Father be infinite in his Subſtance, in his Wiſdom, his Power, his Goodneſs, he is God in the moſt adequate and perfect ſenſe of the Word.* I ſay, well, and what then? If therefore he mean the *Son* and the *Holy Ghoſt* muſt be excluded the *Godhead*, let him prove his conſequence if he can. And he may find the anſwer to it, *Sob. Enquiry*, pag. 53. I ſhall not tranſcribe,

ſcribe, nor love, when I have writ a Book, to write it over again. His Notion may fit *Pagans* well enough, or thoſe who are not otherwiſe taught. Chriſtians are directed to underſtand that the *Deity* includes *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghoſt*. Their *equality* I acknowledg with the mentioned *Athanaſian* Exception; notwithſtanding which, that they *equally communicate* in the moſt *Characteriſtick difference* of the *Deity*, from all Creatures, *viz. Neceſſity of Exiſtence*, is conceivable enough.

To ſum up all, the *Conſiderator* I underſtand, even by the whole management of his Diſcourſe, and ſpecially *by the concluſion of that part wherein the Enquirer is concern'd*, to have moſt entirely given up this Cauſe, as ever did any Man.

The *Enquirer's* only Undertaking was to maintain *the poſſibility of a Trinity in the Godhead*, in oppoſition to his *former*, daring Aſſertion, of *its being impoſſible, and nonſenſe*.

He

He now, *in concluſion*, ſays, the *Enquirer* ſaw *there muſt be a Nexus*; intimating, if there can, that he hath gain'd his point; *but*, 'tis added, *he durſt not venture to ſay what it was.* To which I muſt ſay,

That this is moſt *uncautiouſly* ſaid, I will not ſay, deceitfully, tho I know 'tis ſaid *untruly*; and he might have known (or remembred) too, that he (the Enquirer) often ſpoke of it, as a *neceſſary, natural, eternal, vital, and moſt intimate Union.*

He further ſays, *he only explains it by the Union of Soul and Body.* Which again,

1. Is ſo great a Miſrepreſentation, that I wonder he would ſay it *here*, when he himſelf but two or three Pages off recites *as the Enquirer's words*, "[If God "could unite into one, two ſuch con-"trary Natures, let any Man give me "a reaſon why he might not (much "more) firſt make, and then unite "two, and if two, why not three Spi-

"rits,

" rits, &c.] Is this *only* to explain it by the *Union of Soul and Body*?

But by the way that [firſt *make*, and then unite] was none of the *Enquirer's*, but appears thruſt in to make what was manifeſtly poſſible, ſeem impoſſible. *Sic notus*----Let *two Subſtances* be *created entire*, with no *natural Propenſion* to each other, they are capable of no *natural Union*, without change of *their Natures*. Who ſees not, it were a Contradiction to ſuppoſe them, *the ſame ſtill*, and *not the ſame*? But ſuppoſe them created with *mutual aptitudes* to Union, and united, what ſhould hinder but they may continue united, without being confounded?

2. And 'tis ſaid *impertinently*, as well as *untruly*; for what if he had not explain'd it at all, is it therefore *impoſſible*, which it belonged to him to prove, or he did nothing; and he hath done nothing towards it. I have askt him before, and now I put it again ſeriouſly

to him, whether he do in his Conſcience believe this a good *Argument* [Such an Union, *i. e.* natural, neceſſary, *&c.* hath no pattern or parallel in the Creation; therefore it is impoſſible in the Nature of God?]

For what he adds, *That the Soul and Body in a Man are not united into one Subſtance or Eſſence, nor poſſibly can be*; The Cauſe indeed depends not on it, but lies remote from it. Methinks however it is very feat, and ſhews him pinch't, that he can be brought to this! Hath *a Man* no Subſtance? Is he a ſhadow? Or hath he no Eſſence? Is he a Non-entity? Or is his Eſſence a *Body*? Then *a Body is a Man.* Or is his Eſſence *a Spirit*? Then, *a Spirit is a Man.* If he ſay either of theſe, I wiſh he would tell us the *quantity* of *thoſe Propoſitions*, that we may know whether he means *that every Body is a Man*, or *every Spirit is a Man*? I am ſure where the *Eſſence* is, there muſt be the *Eſſentiatum.* Or whether Soul and Body

dy united, make nothing different from *either*, or *both* diſunited? Or whether a Man be only ſuch a thing as a *Pye*? Or why might not a Pudding ſerve as well, if made up of ſeveral Ingredients? He hath greatly indeed oblig'd Mankind for ſuch an Honour done them! If indeed the Cauſe depended on it, he would have good ſtore of *Philoſophers* to confute, and all that have any concern for their own kind, before he could diſprove the poſſibility of the ſuppoſed Union in the Deity, and you have nothing for it but his bare word: Which (at leaſt, without the addition of his *Name*) will not do the buſineſs. Nor, if he could alſo bring us a demonſtration againſt the Union of Soul and Body, can he thereby prove ſuch an Union as we ſuppoſe in the Godhead impoſſible. The caſe is quite another. The Union of the Soul and Body was never by me called *eſſential*; for I well know, if they were *eſſentially united*, in the ſtrict ſenſe

they could never be diſunited. But 'tis commonly call'd a *ſubſtantial Union*, and I called it *natural* in reſpect of the Principle, *Nature*, in contradiſtinction to *Art*. As for the *ſuppoſed Union* we ſpeak of in the *Deity*, that, being *neceſſary*, *original*, *eternal*, it muſt be *eſſential*, or none; but with ſuch diſtinction as before was ſuppoſed. For it was *Union*, not *Identity*, that was meant, *which Union*, *with ſuch diſtinction*, *till they be proved impoſſible*, the *Enquirer's* Cauſe is untoucht. And is certainly to any ſuch purpoſe, *not in the leaſt touch'd by the Conſiderator*.

Whether there be any *ſuch Union* that may admit to be called *eſſential* among the Creatures, doth neither make nor marr. We have never ſaid there was, nor doth the ſtreſs of the Cauſe lie upon it.

I find indeed an ingenious, merry Gentleman animadverts upon a *Poſtſcript* writ againſt the *Sober Enquiry*, and upon *a Letter* in anſwer to it, who at a venture

venture calls all *eſſential Union*, *eſſential Contradiction*, and *ſubſtantial Nonſenſe*. Who this is, I will not pretend to gueſs, only I gueſs him not to be the ſame with the *Conſiderator*, for *this*, beſides *other Reaſons*, that he calls the *Author of the Conſiderations* a *great Man*; and I ſcarce think he would call himſelf ſo. His Wit, and ſportful Humour, I ſhould have liked better in a leſs ſerious Affair. For *this* heboldly pronounces, in immediate reference to *the Trinity it ſelf*, (that the World might know he hath a *Confidence*, at leaſt, equal to his *Wit*) I can eaſily abſtain from *aſſerting* that any *created Unions* are to be called ſtrictly *eſſential*, becauſe then they muſt be *ſimply indiſſoluble*. And I ſee not but whatſoever things *the Creator* hath united, he may diſunite, if he be ſo pleaſed. Yet one might have expected *this Author* to have been a little more civil to *him* whom he ſtiles *the late famous Dr.* More, who hath publiſht to the World his expreſs Senti-

ments in this matter, that created Spirits have *real amplitude*, made up of *indiſcerpible parts*, eſſentially united, ſo as not to be ſeparable, without annihilation of the whole. One would think he ſhould not have treated *him* ſo, as to make *his eſſential Union*, *ſubſtantial Nonſenſe*.

But there are thoſe left in the World, who have that Veneration for the Doctor, as to think it no indecent rudeneſs to this Gentleman, not to put his judgment in the ballance againſt *the Doctor's*, or to diſtinguiſh between his calling it *Nonſenſe*, and proving it ſo.

But if any wonder that they who think there is no ſuch thing as an *eſſential Union* among Creatures, do yet think there may be in the *uncreated Being*, they will ſhew themſelves mighty wiſe in their wonder, *i. e.* in wondering that the Creatures are not God. And if they further hereupon enquire, why we will

then

then make uſe of *Unions not eſſential*, among Creatures, to illuſtrate *that* which is ſuppoſed *eſſential* in the uncreated Being, and expect very particular, diſtinct accounts of every thing ſo repreſented; they will ſhew themſelves as wiſe in their Expectations, *i. e.* that they think nothing can ſerve to illuſtrate, unleſs it be *like in all reſpects.*

That Queſtion ſtill returns. Is every thing to be judg'd by any Man of ſenſe impoſſible in God, whereof he hath not given diſtinct and explicit accounts, and illuſtrations from ſomewhat in the Creatures? And another will be added, Is there any thing originally *in God*, not eſſential to him?

But *when* the World is ſo full of inſtances of *ſubſtantial Unions*, without Confuſion, or Identification, that he cannot ſo much as name me a created Subſtance, that he can be ſure exiſts *abſolutely ſimple*, I am ſure it can be no contradiction to ſuppoſe that there may

be uncreated, neceſſary, eternal Union, without Confuſion or Identification; and that it would be, as he phraſes it, eſſential Contradiction, or ſubſtantial Nonſenſe, to ſay that things united neceſſarily (tho diſtinct) can poſſibly ever admit of Separation. And if our modern *Anti-Trinitarians* (for I will not call them by the *inept* Name of *Unitarians*, which as rightfully belongs to them whoſe Adverſaries they are pleas'd to be, as *to themſelves*, and therefore cannot diſtinguiſh the one from the other) would allow it to be their Method to underſtand the Doctrine of the *Orthodox Antients*, before they decry and hoot at it, they would find that as *they* allow ſufficient *diſtinction* of the *ſacred Hypoſtaſes*; ſo *the Union* they aſſert, is not ſuch as *identifies* them, but only ſignifies them *to be inſeparable*. So ſpeaks *Athanaſius* himſelf, *We think not as the* Sabellians, that the Son is of *one and the ſame Eſſence with the Father, but conſubſtantial*---Nor do we aſſert

assert *three Hypostases separated* as with Men, *bodily, lest with the Gentiles, we should admit Polytheism,* &c.

Μεμερισμένας. Εκθ. πις.

So do *Liberius* and he agree in Sentiment. The one says, *The Son is not separated from the Father's Hypostasis. The other, We hold not the Son divided from the Father,* &c.

Liber. Epist. ad Athan. ȣ μερίζεται.

Rescript. Ath. ad Liberium. ȣ διακεχωρισμένον.

And upon the most impartial, faithful, and diligent search and consideration, I do solemnly declare there needed not more of *rationality*, or *intelligibleness* in *this Doctrine*, to keep it from being ridicul'd, as contradictious, and nonsense; but only *less prejudice*, and *more modesty* in the Opposers of it, with more reverence of the Divine Majesty, upon this (obvious) apprehension, that *if it be true*, it must be *Sacred, Divine Truth.*

This

This *Author* would fain have me with him to the Play-Houſe, whither really I have no leaſure to accompany him, nor much temptation; for I perceive it hath fill'd his Mind with *Ideas* not uſeful to my purpoſe; nor, I think, to any good one of his own. If there he learned to jeſt away that which ſhould be the beſt part of himſelf; and of which *Socrates*, dying, told his Friends it would be gone far enough out of their hands, and for that which was left behind, they might bury, or do with it what they pleaſed. If there he was taught to ridicule the Holy Apoſtle's diſtinction of (an ὁ ἔσω, and ὁ ἔξω,) an *inner* and *an outer Man*; and when he hath thrown the *former* of theſe out of his Notion of himſelf, for my part, I muſt think of that which is left, that the *ſilly Indian* is the leſs *ſilly Creature* of the two.

And beſides, as he is too much given to play, to mind any thing of ſerious Diſcourſe, ſo I find he is not throughout honeſt

honeſt in his Play neither; but that even when he pretends to ſit out, and be but *a Spectator*, only taking care that there be fair play, he falls in himſelf, and plays booty. Nor do I find he hath any thing of Argument in his Diſcourſe, which hath not been conſidered already in the Diſcourſe I have had with the *Conſiderator*. I therefore take leave of them both together, and of you too, Sir, being in great Sincerity

Your Affectionate

Humble Servant,

The Enquirer.

Errata. Pag. 21. l. 20. r. γεννητὸς. P. 51. l. 11. r. αἰτιατὰ.

ADVER-

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE *Letter to the Clergy of both Universities*, came not to my Sight, or Notice, till ſome hours after the laſt Sheet of this Diſcourſe was brought me from the Preſs; I have not time therefore to ſay much to it, nor yet ſhould ſay more than I do had I never ſo much. The Author ſeems to think what he was now doing, *as to the Enquiry, ſuperfluous, becauſe he ſaid it was ſo fully done by another Hand*, &c. In the mean time he was in ill caſe, that he was neither *able* to write to any purpoſe, nor be ſilent: A moſt deplorable double *Impotency*? But he hath notwithſtanding his Modeſty, ſhown a double *Ability*, to invent and make an *Hypotheſis* of his own Fingers Ends, and then moſt dexterouſly to combat that Shadow. *Three inadequate Gods*, is indeed (to uſe his own Phraſe) *his own Invention*, conſtantly diſavow'd by the *Enquirer*, who, with the generality of Trinitarians, calls the three Subſiſtents in the Godhead, *God*; being each of them neceſſarily exiſtent, but none of them alone excluſively, a *God*.

What Art he hath is ſhewn in fighting this his own *Figment*. As alſo *that* of Parts of the Deity, other than conceptible, which no Man can avoid. So we have his Dream of a *third part*

part of a God, about which he ſo learnedly raves in his Dream, as to diſprove, as effectually, any God at all. For I appeal to what Senſe he hath left himſelf, whether *Power alone* be God excluſive of *Wiſdom and Goodneſs?* Then 'tis an inadequate, or a not compleat Notion of God, then by his profound reaſoning, *not eternal.* No more are Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt *Parts*, unleſs you be enamoured of the *Bull, impartible Parts*, that never were parted, nor ever can be. As what are *neceſſarily* united (tho unconfounded) cannot without Nonſenſe and Contradiction, be ſaid to be parted. His Fiction, that what is from the eternal Father by *neceſſary Emanation, cannot be eternal, but muſt have a beginning*, is of the ſame *ſtamp.* He did not need when he writ, to have abandoned all Logick and common Senſe, that would have told him *relata ſunt ſimul naturâ.* His ſo confidently taking it for granted on all Hands, that *all Infinites are equal*, ſhews his little compaſs of Thought, and how unacquainted he is with the Difficulties of a Controverſy, wherein yet he will be ſo over-meddleſome. *Qui pauca reſpicit*, &c. But who ſo bold as ----? I leave him to compound that Difference with his *abler Conſiderator, Whether one Inch and two Inches be equal?* and ſo bid him good night.

FINIS.

BOOKS written by the Reverend Mr. JOHN HOWE.

1. THE Bleſſedneſs of the Righteous: The Vanity of this Mortal Life, on *Pſal.* 17. *ver.* 15. and *Pſal.* 89. 47.

2. Delighting in God.

3. Living Temple.

4. Self-dedication diſcourſed in the Anniverſary Thankſgiving of a Perſon of Honour for a great Deliverance.

5. Of Thoughtfulneſs for the Morrow. With an Appendix concerning the immoderate Deſire of fore-knowing things to come.

6. Of Charity in reference to other Mens Sins.

7. The Redeemer's Tears wept over loſt Souls, in a Treatiſe on *Luke* 19. 41,42. With an Appendix, wherein ſomewhat is occaſionally diſcourſed concerning the Sin againſt the Holy Ghoſt, and how God is ſaid to will the Salvation of them that periſh.

8. A Funeral Sermon for that Faithful and Laborious Servant of Chriſt, Mr. *Richard Fairclough*, (who deceaſed *July* 4. 1682. in the ſixty firſt Year of his Age.)

9. A Sermon directing what we are to do after a ſtrict Enquiry whether or no we truly love God.

10. A

10. A Funeral Sermon for Mrs. *Eſther Sampſon*, the late Wife of *Henry Sampſon*, Dr. of Phyſick, who died *Nov.* 24. 1689.

11. The Carnality of Religious Contention. In two Sermons Preach'd at the *Merchants Lecture* in *Broadſtreet*.

12. A Calm and Sober Enquiry concerning the Poſſibility of a Trinity in the Godhead.

13. A Letter to a Friend concerning a Poſtſcript to the Defence of Dr. *Sherlock*'s Notion of the Trinity in Unity, relating to the Calm and Sober Enquiry upon the ſame Subject.

BOOKS

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